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ABSTRACT  
 
   
Smart cities are the next wave of rapid expansion of Internet of Things (IoT). A 
smart city is a designation given to a city that incorporates information and communication 
technologies (ICT) to enhance the quality and performance of urban services, such as 
energy, transportation, healthcare, communications, entertainments, education, e-
commerce, businesses, city management, and utilities, to reduce resource consumption, 
wastage and overall costs. The overarching aim of a smart city is to enhance the quality of 
living for its residents and businesses, through technology. In a large ecosystem, like a 
smart city, many organizations and companies collaborate with the smart city government 
to improve the smart city. These entities may need to store and share critical data with each 
other. A smart city has several thousands of smart devices and sensors deployed across the 
city. Storing critical data in a secure and scalable manner is an important issue in a smart 
city. While current cloud-based services, like Splunk and ELK (Elasticsearch-Logstash-
Kibana), offer a centralized view and control over the IT operations of these smart devices, 
it is still prone to insider attacks, data tampering, and rogue administrator problems. In this 
thesis, we present an approach using blockchain to recovering critical data from 
unauthorized modifications. We use extensive simulations based on complex adaptive 
system theory, for evaluation of our approach. Through mathematical proof we proved that 
the approach always detects an unauthorized modification of critical data. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Motivation 
 
With the advancement of internet of things (IoT), many tedious and onerous day to day 
activities have become easy and manageable. Application of IoT in automating various 
tasks at home lead to the coining of the term ‘smart home’. Many appliances can be 
connected to make it convenient for the user to operate them. Now the world is foreseeing 
a future where things can be automated on a larger scale to provide convenience and 
services to a bigger segment of the population. Businesses and academia are exploring the 
concept of ‘smart city’, where there is a larger level of interaction of sensors, devices, 
services, organizations, etc. To provide better experience to the citizens and the smart city 
government. A smart city is a designation given to a city that incorporates information and 
communication technologies (ICT) to enhance the quality and performance of urban 
services such as energy, transportation and utilities to reduce resource consumption, 
wastage and overall costs [1] [2] [3] [4]. The overarching aim of a smart city is to enhance 
the quality of living for its citizens through technology. Many countries are investing in 
smart city projects and there are many cities across the world that are considered as a smart 
city. Countries like USA, China, India, UK, etc. have started developing smart cities for 
the future while modifying the current cities to make them smarter. 
This thesis presents the new perspective to approach some of the problems of the smart 
city. Very few researches are exploring the disruptive power of blockchain and how it can 
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impact the functioning of a smart city. An approach is being presented on how blockchain 
can be used on a smart city services platform to enable businesses and companies to 
participate in the smart city environment. The focus of this thesis is to address a key 
security challenge of identifying, locating and recovering from unauthorized tampering of 
critical data in a smart city using a blockchain approach. 
Smart cities can be either open or closed in nature depending on the demographics of the 
city as well as the political and economic conditions of the nation. European based smart 
cities are open in nature and they encourage investors and business to invest in the smart 
city services domain. Smart cities like Singapore and Hong Kong are more inclined 
towards the smart city government owning most of the assets and they encourage unilateral 
business dealing with tight constraints in the smart city. 
In this thesis, the research underwent the following steps. First, the differences between an 
open and closed smart city (in terms of data ownership and sharing) were simulated and 
explored [25]. Second, a thorough literature survey was done to identify various challenges 
in a smart city. Among the various challenges present, we chose the problem of addressing 
unauthorized modification of critical data. Various potential solutions were considered and 
based on the problem context we found the blockchain technology to be relevant [8] [12] 
[13] [14] [15] [16]. Blockchain technology was carefully studied and various aspects were 
redesigned to make it suitable for the problem. Lastly, we performed some more simulation 
experiments to compare the communication and network overhead costs between the 
currently used centralized approach and our blockchain approach. 
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1.2 Organization of Thesis 
 
This thesis is divided into 8 chapters. The first chapter is the introduction which gives an 
overview of the research. The second chapter gives a background on some of the topics 
like smart cities, blockchain and smart contracts. The third chapter describes the problem 
that we are trying to solve and how the current approach does not fully address it. The 
fourth chapter goes in to the methodology adopted for approaching this problem. We define 
the system model, an experimental simulation of smart city and various notation in this 
chapter. The fifth and sixth chapters describes the blockchain based solutions and covers 
the detailed aspects of it. We provide mathematical proof along with the simulations to 
present the advantages and weaknesses of our approach as compared to the centralized 
approaches. The last chapter is the conclusion which also gives some directions to the 
future works. 
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CHAPTER 2 
CURRENT STATE OF ART AND BACKGROUND 
 
Most of the smart city initiatives depend on cloud based services and infrastructure to 
perform smart city related IT operations and functions. These cloud-based IT services are 
centralized in nature and many use the traditional client-server model of interaction. The 
on-demand capabilities of cloud coupled with high availability and scalability makes it the 
default choice for any kind of smart city initiative [5]. While it offers a lot of advantage, 
there are some weaknesses to this current approach. For example, problems like insider 
attacks and rogue administrator [22]; unauthorized tampering can be sometimes difficult 
to detect and mitigate. 
In order to overcome some of the crucial weaknesses of the centralized cloud based 
services, this thesis take a distributed approach which can be coupled with the cloud based 
services at a different abstraction layer. The approach uses blockchain technology to 
counter some of the inherent weaknesses of the centralized approaches and tries to address 
some of the problems in a highly collaborative and volatile environment like smart city. 
We approached the problem mathematically and then evaluated the simulations results to 
understand the dynamic nature of a smart city. 
 
2.1 Smart City 
 
Historically, cities have been the center of growth, economics and culture for any 
civilizations. Due to the advancement of science and technology, we find every field to be 
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assisted by the technology to increase its impact. Smart cities is the meeting place for 
traditional concept of city with technological advancements. The ulterior motive that a 
smart city wants to accomplish is to make the lives of the citizen better and more 
comfortable. So, a smart city can be defined as the interplay of technology and 
organizational establishments to improve the quality of people, community, economics, 
infrastructure, environment, healthcare and governance [1] [2] [3] [4]. There are several 
cities across the world that can be considered as smart. Current smart cities have limited 
features deployed in only small geographical areas for experimentation. Example of some 
of the smart cities are: New York, Vienna, Rio de Janerio, Vancouver, Hong Kong, 
Yinchuan, Paris, London, Barcelona, Berlin, Los Angeles, Mumbai, Copenhagen, etc. 
Each smart city has 3 basic components or factors [3] [4] and they are as follows: 
1. Technological factors 
These include the physical infrastructure, various computing technologies like mobile 
technologies, cloud technologies, virtual technologies, etc. 
2. Human factors 
These include human infrastructure and social capital of the citizens living in the smart 
city. 
3. Institutional factors 
These include governance, policy factors, rules, directive and regulations imposed or 
implemented by the smart city government. 
 
The following are some of the security and privacy challenges [6] [7] of a smart city: 
• Privacy leakage in data sensing 
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• Privacy and availability of data storage and processing 
• Data sharing and access control 
• Trustworthy and dependable control 
• False data injection in sensing and control phase 
• Scalability of security solutions for data and devices 
 
2.2 Blockchain 
Blockchain is a sequence of blocks which store data and these blocks are linked 
cryptographically. This data structure is distributed in its nature and function. Bitcoin [8] 
has been one of the most successful application of the blockchain technology. A block in 
the blockchain consists of a block header and a block body (Figure 1). Each block header 
contains the cryptographic hash of its previous block which logically forms a link between 
blocks. 
 
Figure 1 Blockchain Structure 
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 A blockchain header (Figure 2) contains following information [8]: 
• Hash: Hash of the entire previous block 
• Timestamp (TS): Timestamp of the instance when the block was added to the 
blockchain 
• Root_Hash: Root node of the hash tree of all the data stored in this block. 
• Nonce: A random value added to block to make the hash of entire block satisfy the 
cryptographic challenge condition. 
 
 
In figure 2, let us consider 3 arbitrary consecutive blocks: Block n-1, Block n and Block 
n+1. The first field in the block header is hash. The hash value of the entire previous block 
is stored in here. So, Block n-1 will store the hash value of Block n-2, Block n will store 
the hash value of Block n-1, etc. The second field in the block header is the timestamp 
Figure 2 Blockchain Header 
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(TS). The time at which the block was added to the blockchain is recorded here. In the 
figure, Block n-1 has the timestamp TS(n-1), Block n has the timestamp TS(n), and so on.  
The third field in the blockchain header is the Root_Hash. Every block header has an 
associated blockchain body which stores the data. In bitcoin application [8], all the 
transaction information is stored in the blockchain body. In general, any kind of data can 
be stored here. Let’s assume that Block n has 4 data files namely: D0, D1, D2 and D3. 
These 4 files will be stored in the block body. The hash will be generated for each of the 
file. So, hash of file D0 is Hash0, D1 is Hash1 and so on. Then we calculate the hash of 
each of these hashes in pair and we keep on repeating this till we get a single hash value at 
the root node of the hash tree. This value is stored in the field Root_Hash of the block 
header. The fourth field is the nonce. Nonce is a random value which is generated to ensure 
that the hash of the entire block (along with the nonce value) satisfies certain condition. 
Bitcoin based blockchain requires the nodes, which want to add a block, to perform proof 
of work. A cryptographic challenge should be solved in order for the node to add a block 
to the blockchain. An example of a cryptographic challenge: the hash of the entire block 
should start with seven 0s. Since the data cannot be changed, the nodes change the value 
of the nonce to find a hash which satisfies the given challenge. Among many nodes which 
are competing to add a new block, the first node which successfully solves the challenge 
gets to add the new block to the blockchain.  
The cryptographic hash functions that are employed in the blockchain must have the 
following properties [9]: 
1. Pre-image resistance 
Given a value of hash h, it should be difficult to find a message m such that  
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h= Hash (m). 
 
2. Second pre-image resistance 
Given an input m1 it should be difficult to find another message m2 such that 
Hash (m1) = Hash (m2) 
3. Collision resistant 
It should be difficult to find two messages m1 and m2 such that 
Hash (m1) = Hash (m2) 
Cryptography is a key unit in the entire blockchain structure. Apart from the hash functions, 
blockchain employs public key infrastructure in its working. Bitcoin [8] infrastructure 
assigns a public key private key pair to all its participants. Public key is used as an address 
to transfer bitcoins and private keys are used as a digital signature for every transaction. 
This allows for integrity, non-repudiation and confidentiality in the entire bitcoin 
infrastructure [8]. 
The data that is added to the blockchain must be verified by the network as a whole. There 
may exist a divergence of a branch in the blockchain network. There is a need for consensus 
on a data in a network which might have untrusted nodes. This is an offshoot of the 
Byzantine Generals Problem (BGP) [10]. In a bitcoin network, a consensus is needed on a 
transaction when there are several untrusted nodes in the network. 
The following are two of the most popular ways to reach a consensus: 
• Proof of work (POW) 
This consensus strategy is used commonly in bitcoin network [8]. A node needs to 
perform computationally expensive operations in order to add a new block to the 
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blockchain. Such nodes are called miners. A cryptographic challenge is one of the 
way to ensure that the nodes satisfy this condition. The POW procedure to find the 
solution of the cryptographic challenge is the process of mining. Each node must 
find a nonce value which will satisfy the cryptographic challenge. The first node to 
solve this can add its block to the blockchain. Bitcoin network offers an incentive 
(a small value of bitcoin) to the node which successfully adds a block. Since there 
can be several possible block options in the blockchain to build upon, the network 
considers the longest blockchain as the correct and the most updated one. 
 
• Proof of stake (POS) 
This was proposed as an alternative to POW. This energy efficient method uses 
ownership to reach consensus. Unlike POW, which asks people to find a nonce for 
a cryptographic challenge, POS [11] requires people to prove their ownership of 
currency. The rationale behind this approach is that people with more currency are 
less likely to attack the network. This approach is unfair as the richest person can 
have a dominant say in validation process. 
  
One of the key limitation of the blockchain method is that if at least 51% of the network is 
compromised or if 51% of the nodes pool their resources, they can gain control of the entire 
network. The incentive provided in POW helps to counter this as mining operation is 
expensive and pooling the resources can lead to high operations costs for a low value return. 
The blockchain has following key properties [12] [13] [14]: 
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1. Decentralization 
Unlike conventional centralized systems, where every validation is done by a 
trusted party, blockchain offers a peer to peer setup where any node can perform 
validation without the need of a central trusted party. This helps in avoiding 
bottlenecks, single point of failure and reduces the server cost which are required 
in centralized systems. 
2. Networked integrity and security 
Security and integrity is encoded in every step of the way using cryptography. The 
system offers confidentiality, authenticity and non-repudiation to all the activities 
depending on how cryptographic concepts are used. 
3. High availability 
Since the data is replicated and stored in several nodes, the data is highly available 
and accessible to all nodes in the network. 
4. Enforced rights 
Ownership rights are transparent and enforceable. Smart contracts offer a way to 
ensure this. Due to the public key infrastructure, nodes can maintain anonymity and 
digital signatures and asymmetric cryptography can help implement access rights. 
5. Auditability 
Since all data stored on a blockchain are validated and recorded with a timestamp 
along with cryptographic hashes, the data can be easily monitored and verified with 
its previous records across the distributed network. 
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2.3 Smart Contracts 
 
A Smart Contract is "a computerized transaction protocol that executes the terms of a 
contract."[14]. Smart contracts are automated scripts which ensure that the conditions put 
in the contract are always met. Smart contracts are deployed on blockchain and are used 
by companies and organizations to conduct business and transactions over the distributed 
blockchain network without the need for an intermediary. Smart contracts can include 
business contracts in computer program format as well as algorithms and policies translated 
into a piece of code for enforcing certain conditions on a blockchain. Smart contracts exist 
in the blockchain and they are implemented autonomously and routinely in a prearranged 
manner at every node of the network [15] [16]. In our approach, we employ the use of 
smart contracts for the following reasons: 
• To facilitate businesses and organizations to conduct their business relations with 
each other as well as the smart city government in a secure and transparent manner. 
• To enforce the rules and regulations imposed by the smart city government on 
various participants of the ecosystem. 
• To run various protocols and algorithms to ensure smooth functioning of the 
blockchain infrastructure. 
Ethereum [17] is the most commonly used platform for smart contracts, however there are 
other platforms which are coming up. Ethereum [17] offers a Turing complete language 
which is the reason why it is so popular among researchers and businesses. 
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CHAPTER 3 
PROBLEM STATEMENT 
 
Smart cities are increasingly using the cloud based services for various smart city related 
applications. Cloud based IT services provide a centralized view of the entire ecosystem’s 
IT operations and offers a single go-to platform for all the IT operations, activity and 
information in the smart city. Sensors that are deployed throughout the smart city are 
connected to a single point cloud application for monitoring, auditing, maintenance, 
regulatory, etc. reasons [18] [19] [20] [21]. In a smart city, there are many thousands of 
sensors deployed across the city which are collecting information from its surroundings. 
These sensors can collect data like temperature, moisture, wind speed, air quality, water 
quality, congestion on roads, waiting time in traffic, garbage bin levels, videos of citizens, 
GPS location, etc. A smart city also need to collect and store critical data for its functioning 
[5] [6] [18] [19] [20]. In an open environment as simulated in case 2 (see Evaluation 
chapter), there will be a degree of data sharing involved for all kinds of data. If a critical 
data is shared with several participants by the smart city, then there must be proper 
mechanisms in place to identify and recover from tampering of this critical data. Past 
statistics and research [18] [22] show that insider threat can be a serious problem especially 
if the insider has privileges. This rogue administrator problem [22] can lead to loss of 
confidentiality and integrity of critical data. Cloud based solutions like Splunk [23] and 
ELK (Elasticsearch-Logstash-Kibana) [24] provide a centralized view of all kinds of 
machine generated data. These tools then provide an interface to different kinds of end 
users to perform different kinds of roles. Privileged users like admin can access most of 
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the critical data since all the data is stored in a centralized repository. This is a serious 
problem that we want to address in this thesis. The problem that we want to address in this 
thesis is how can we identify, locate and recover from any unauthorized modifications of 
archived critical data of a smart city in a timely manner. 
Solving this problem will be a key component in tackling some of the security problem 
present in the smart city domain. Cities of the future will have a very high degree of inter-
connectivity and data sharing [2] [3] [4] [18]. Unauthorized tampering of data for personal, 
social, financial, political and economic reasons will be a big problem faced by the smart 
city. We try to address this problem with a narrowed scope using blockchain technology in 
this thesis. 
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CHAPTER 4 
SMART CITY SYSTEM MODEL 
 
We will be using the system model defined in [25] for our approach. We consider the 
following entities and capabilities in our smart city service initiative: 
• Hosts (H): Any business entity or organization that wants to deploy its analytical 
models on smart devices and do business. 
A set of hosts (company and business participants) 
  H = {H1, H2, ... Hp}   or 
  H= {Hi}      (1) 
for i = 0 to p 
• Smart Object Host (SOH): Smart objects are associated with a smart object owner 
or host which provides the smart objects as service and allows provision for 
pushing predictive models and algorithms to the SOs. 
A set of smart object hosts (sensor cluster owners) 
 SOH = {SOH1, SOH2, ... SOHq}  or   
 SOH = {SOHi}     (2) 
for i = 0 to q 
• Smart object (SO): Any end point devices, with limited storage and computing 
capabilities, that can operate to some extent interactively and autonomously. 
Example: smart phones, security camera, intelligent kiosk, amazon echo, etc. 
The set of smart objects owned by smart object hosts (actual smart objects with 
sensors belonging to a sensor cluster owner) (from 2) 
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SOSOHi = {SOSOHi,1, SOSOHi,2, … SOSOHi,m}   
  SOSOHi = {SOSOHi,j}      (3) 
   for i=0 to q  
for j=0 to m 
• A Sense is an input or output of a sensor.  
A set for some smart object, SOi, has senses S. (from (3)) 
 S = {SSOi,1, SSOi,2, ... SSOi,n}  or   
 S = {SSOi,j}      (4) 
for i = 0 to r   
   for j = 0 to n 
• K is a subset of smart object (owned by SOH i) and its corresponding senses 
 K ⊆{SOSOHi ,Sj}     (5) 
for i=0 to r   
for j=0 to t 
• Analytical/predictive model (AM/PM):  A predictive model is a function of a subset 
of the senses that smart object is capable of, and the output of the model is also a 
sense that smart object is capable of. Any algorithm working on a smart device can 
be considered as a predictive model. 
A set of predictive models (PM) deployed by some smart object host, SOHj at the 
direction of a host Hi or a smart object host, SOHj, itself to some smart object, 
SOSOHj,q: 
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Using (4) and (5) we get the following function, 
 
PM = [F: 𝐾 → 𝐾]     (f1) 
 
Contract provisions are required to address ownership and other characteristics that can 
possibly influence the design and operation of a smart city service platform. We used the 
various contract provisions identified in [25] for data ownership. [25] categorizes the 
contract provision for data ownership in the following way: 
 
• Data exclusivity vs. Non-exclusivity: This contract provision states whether data is 
exclusively owned or co-owned. For example, a contract may specify that an soh 
owns all the data generated by the SOs connected to it. Data is considered non-
exclusive when it is co-owned by several entities or when it is open for access. 
 
• Co-mingling vs. No co-mingling: This contract provision states whether the 
predictive model derived from the co-owned data is exlusively owned or co-
cowned. If there is no comingling, the entity that creates the model owns the model 
exclusively. 
 
• Data post-use vs. No data post-use: In a data post-use contract provision, if a data 
owner leaves the ecosystem or partnership governed by this contract, then the co-
owned data becomes the assets of the remaining owner(s) (if any). If there is no 
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data post-use contract clause, then the data owned by the exiting entity is deleted 
from the ecosystem. 
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CHAPTER 5 
OVERALL APPROACH 
 
In our approach, we synergize the smart cities’ infrastructure with blockchain to address 
the problem of unauthorized modification in a smart city. The blockchain which will be 
deployed in the smart city ecosystem will be a private and permissioned blockchain. That 
means if a company or an organization wants to enter this ecosystem, they will have to 
get the smart city government’s permission. The blockchain will not be accessible to 
everyone. 
 
Figure 3 Smart City Blockchain with Major and Minor Nodes 
 
Only the allowed organizations and citizen groups can access the blockchain. In this 
ecosystem, any node (whether it is belonging to an organization, government or citizen 
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groups) can be classified as one of the following two types on the basis of computation 
power and storage capabilities: 
1. Major node 
These nodes have enough resources (computation power and storage) to use and 
maintain blockchain infrastructure. These nodes will be responsible for 
participating actively in the blockchain infrastructure. All the black nodes in figure 
3 are major nodes. Major nodes will perform some crucial function like: 
1.1. Accessing and connecting to the blockchain infrastructure 
1.2. Replicating and downloading the content of the blockchain 
1.3. Listening for incoming request 
1.4. Validating the incoming requests 
1.5. Forwarding or passing on a valid request 
1.6. Listening for new blocks 
1.7. Validating new blocks 
1.8. Forwarding or passing on valid blocks 
1.9. Creation of new blocks 
1.10. Mining the blocks 
Each of the above-mentioned functions are crucial for correct functioning of the 
blockchain infrastructure. 
 
2. Minor nodes 
These nodes do not have enough resources to maintain and manage the blockchain 
infrastructure. These nodes usually forward the request to a major node for 
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processing. The blue blocks in figure 3 are the minor nodes. A minor node will have 
the following functions in the blockchain infrastructure: 
2.1. Accessing and connecting to the blockchain infrastructure 
2.2. Listening to incoming request 
2.3. Forwarding or passing on a request 
2.4. Forwarding or passing on valid blocks 
 
In our approach, we replicate and store critical data at all the major nodes. This helps in 
recovery from unauthorized modifications as well as provides high availability of critical 
data across the ecosystem. This critical data will be encrypted and will only be accessible 
to the authorized groups or individuals. 
 
5.1 Steps to Adding Critical Data to the Blockchain Infrastructure 
 
 
An important part of our approach is the addition of data in a secure way. Any node (major 
or minor) can add critical data to the blockchain only if they have the permission to do so, 
from the smart city government. 
The following are the steps to add critical data to the blockchain for a major node: 
1. Broadcast the data to be added to the blockchain network. 
2. The requested data is validated by the other major nodes of the network using smart 
contracts and other functioning algorithms (like authentication services) working 
on the blockchain ecosystem. 
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3. If the majority of the major nodes validate the data then the data is added to a new 
block, along with the other validated data, by all the major nodes. If the data is not 
validated by the majority, then it is discarded and an entry is made into the logs. 
4. Once the block size is exhausted with validated data, the major nodes solve a 
cryptographic challenge. 
5. The first major node to solve it will broadcast the solved block (with corresponding 
timestamp and nonce) as the latest block to the blockchain network. 
6. Other major nodes will add this latest block to their blockchain. 
7. The nodes which requested to add the data will receive an acknowledgement if their 
data was successfully added to the block. If their data was invalidated, they will 
receive a message stating the same. If they don’t receive an acknowledgement 
within the timeout span, they will re-broadcast the data to the blockchain network.  
 
The following are the steps to add critical data to the blockchain for a minor node: 
1. The minor node will send the request to add the data to the nearest major node 
(nearest can be in terms of demographics or network latency) 
2. The major node will broadcast the data to be added to the blockchain network. 
3. The requested data is validated by the other major nodes of the network using smart 
contracts and other functioning algorithms (like authentication services) working 
on the blockchain ecosystem. 
4. If the majority of the major nodes validate the data then the data is added to a new 
block, along with the other validated data, by all the major nodes. If the data is not 
validated by the majority, then it is discarded and an entry is made into the logs. 
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5. Once the block size is exhausted with validated data, the major nodes solve a 
cryptographic challenge. 
6. The first major node to solve it will broadcast the solved block (with corresponding 
timestamp and nonce) as the latest block to the blockchain network. 
7. Other major nodes will add this latest block to their blockchain. 
 
The nodes which requested to add the data will receive an acknowledgement if its data 
was successfully added to the block. If its data was invalidated, they will receive a 
message stating the same. If they don’t receive an acknowledgement within the timeout 
span, they will resend the data to the nearest major node. 
 
5.2 Steps to Recovering from Unauthorized Modifications of Critical Data 
 
 
There are three major steps in addressing unauthorized modification of critical data in smart 
city. The procedure must be executed every time before a new block is added to the 
blockchain. Figure 4 illustrates the three steps involved in recovering from unauthorized 
modification. 
 
Figure 4 Steps to Recover from Unauthorized Modifications 
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The steps are as follows: 
1. Detection of unauthorized modification in the ecosystem 
• Any change in the data section of the old blocks in the blockchain leads to change 
in the hash of the data and as a result of that, the hash of the block and the root_hash 
also changes. The consecutive blocks get invalidated due to change in these hash 
values. 
• The hash change is identified by the algorithm running on the blockchain 
infrastructure. This step identifies a list of suspicious nodes where the modification 
might have happened. 
2. Identification of the node where the unauthorized modification occurred 
• From the suspicious nodes identified in step 1, we run an algorithm on each of these 
suspicious nodes to verify if it was tampered. 
• The node at which the unauthorized modification took place along with the critical 
data that was modified is identified by our algorithm (section 6.2) by comparing 
the cryptographic hashes on a suspicious node with a normal node. 
• This step verifies the tampering of the node and identified the block(s) where the 
unauthorized modifications occurred. 
3. Recovery from unauthorized modification 
• Once the block is identified, we overwrite the critical data of that block with the 
corresponding block of an untampered node. 
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• The recovery step is complete when the hash values of the overwritten block(s) 
matches the hash value of the corresponding block(s) of an untampered node. 
 
Section 6 of this thesis details out each of these steps along with a scenario. Since, bitcoin 
is the most successful application of the blockchain that use pow, we will be drawing 
analogy from the bitcoin application. A generic CPU uses 6.67KW/GH (i.e. Consumes 
6.67 kilo watts per gigahash operation) [26] [27]. A generic GPU (graphic processing unit) 
uses 0.5KW/GH which is significantly less than mining from a CPU. Bitcoin industry is 
moving towards ASIC [28] for mining. ASIC stands for application specific integrated 
cicuits. These are specially designed equipment for performing a singular task. A generic 
blockchain ASIC [27] uses only 1W/GH which is exponentially less than both CPU and 
GPU. However, asic costs a lot to manufacture. Antminer S2 is an ASIC which works with 
an efficiency of 1.1W/GH and has a capacity of 1000GH/sec. This piece of equipment costs 
around $2259 [27] which is significantly large amount as compared to a CPU or a GPU. 
Cost of electricity in Arizona for 1 KWH is around 11 cents [29]. This means that the cost 
of operation will be significantly less but the initial investment of sophisticated hardware 
will be very large. The complexity of the cryptographic challenge determines the time 
interval between two blocks as well as the computation power required to solve a 
cryptographic challenge 
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CHAPTER 6 
DETECTION OF UNAUTHORIZED MODIFICATION IN THE ECOSYSTEM AND 
IDENTIFICATION OF THE MODIFIED NODE  
 
The following are the notations used in the algorithm: 
▪ M -> Total number of major nodes in the blockchain network 
▪ N -> Total number of blocks in the blockchain 
▪ Bi,j -> Block i of Major node j 
▪ T -> List with all the major nodes in the blockchain network, initially contains all 
the major nodes of the blockchain network. 
▪ t -> Arbitrary major node from T 
▪ ti -> the ith block of the major node t 
▪ SN -> List of suspicious nodes, initially an empty set 
▪ SNj,i represents ith block of node j in SN 
▪ SNj means the jth major node in the SN list 
▪ q -> total number of nodes in SN 
 
The following is the pseudo code for the approach which finds unauthorized 
modifications on a blockchain. 
1. For j= 0 to M do,   //Check for all the major nodes 
2.   For i=0 to N do,  //Check all the blocks on that major node 
3.    If i=0 then  //Condition for first block 
4.     continue 
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5.    Else 
6.     If Hash (Bi-1,j) ≠ Prev_Hash of Bi,j  //Check for hash   
         modification 
7.      Alert() 
8.      T = T – { major node j}  
9.      SN = SN U {major node j} //Mark the node as   
         suspicious 
10.     Else 
11.      Continue 
12.  For j=0 to q,  //Check all the nodes in SN list 
13.     For i=0 to N do,  //Check all blocks of a specific   
       node 
14.  If Root_Hash of SNi,j ≠ Root_Hash of ti 
15.   While (Root_Hash of SNj,i ≠ Root_Hash of ti) 
16.    Overwrite the data in SNj,i with the     
   data in ti 
17.  Else  
18.   Continue 
19.    SN=SN- {SNj} 
The main condition that we are checking for is: Hash(Bi-1) ≠ Prev_Hash of Bi  
We synergize the property of blockchain and cryptography hash to help detect 
unauthorized modification of data. The change in data leads to change in hash. This leads 
to change in hash of the entire block. 
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The time complexity of this step is O(m.n) where m is number of major nodes and n is 
number of blocks in blockchain 
 
6.1 Detection of Unauthorized Modification in the Ecosystem 
 
This is the first step in the procedure for recovering from unauthorized modifications. This 
step must be executed every time before a new block is added to the blockchain. The details 
of the steps are as follows: 
Step 1: Detection of unauthorized modification in the ecosystem 
Input: All the major blocks of the ecosystem. 
1.1 Before addition of a new block to the blockchain, run an automated script on 
every major node 
1.2 For i = 0 to n, where B0 is the first block in the blockchain, B1 is the second 
block in the blockchain … Bi is the (i+1)th block in the blockchain … and Bn 
is the latest/last block in the blockchain, check every consecutive block for the 
following condition. 
If Hash of Block i-1 ≠ Hash(i-1) field of block header Block i, 
Alert and add node i-1 to list of suspicious nodes (SN). [Blockchain 
property 2 in section 2.2] 
Else, return null 
Output of step 1 is a list of suspicious nodes where the tampering might have occurred. 
The time complexity of this step is O(n) where the n is the blockchain length parameter. 
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6.2 Identification of the Modified Node and its Block 
 
This is the second step in the procedure for recovering from unauthorized modifications. 
With the list of suspicious nodes identified in step 1, we locate the specific block(s) where 
the unauthorized modification too place and verify it. The details of step 2 are as follows: 
Step 2: Identification of the node and its block where the unauthorized modification 
occurred 
Input: We take the output of step 1, i.e. List of suspicious nodes (SN) SN = {SNj | 
j=[0,m]}, along with a normal node T (T is any major node which is not present in SN) as 
the input to step 2 
2.1.For every node SNj in SN, generate the hash tree for data of each block  
(Bi | i=[0,n]) in the block chain stored at the node SNj . 
2.1.1 Compare the root node of this generated hash tree with the 
Root_Hash of corresponding Bi of a normal node T 
2.1.2 If they are not equal, then pass the block number i to step 3 and go 
to step 3, else continue 
2.2. Remove the node SNj from SN. 
Output: we pass the tampered block numbers of suspicious nodes SNj from (step 2.1.2.) 
to (step 3). At the end of step 2.2. We get a recovered blockchain at a tampered node. 
After step 2, we proceed to step 3 where the recovery takes place. We use an untampered 
node in the ecosystem and use its block to overwrite the modified block. The specifics of 
the step 3 are as follows: 
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Step 3: Recovering from unauthorized modification 
Input: Block number i of SNj from step 2.1.2 
3.1.Overwrite the identified block i of suspicious node SNj with the corresponding 
block (Bi) of any node T. 
3.2. Calculate the hash of the over written block i and compare it with hash of the 
Bi of a normal node T. (using blockchain property 2 of section 2.2 and 
cryptographic hash property 2 of section 2.2) 
3.3. If the hashes are same then the recovery of the block is complete and 
continue to step 2.1., else go to step 3.1. 
Output: Recovered block of critical data on SNj 
 
6.3 Mathematical Proof 
 
 Let us assume that any three arbitrary consecutive blocks Bi-1, Bi and Bi+1 are the original 
untampered blocks in a blockchain. 
According to the blockchain property 2 (mentioned in section 2.2), 
Hash of block Bi-1  = Hash(Bi-1 ) field of Bi      (1) 
And 
Hash of block Bi  = Hash(Bi ) field of Bi+1      (2) 
Let us say that a malicious actor modified Bi to Q by changing some critical data. 
Data of Bi ≠ Data of Q       (3) 
Let us also assume that the block Q which was tampered was not detected by the above 
procedure. 
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If it was not detected by the above procedure that means the condition in step 1.2 was 
never true. This implies 
Hash of block Bi-1  = Hash(Bi-1 ) field of Q      (4) 
And 
Hash of block Q = Hash(Bi ) field of Bi+1      (5) 
From (1), (2), (4) and (5) we get, 
Hash of block Bi = Hash of block Q      (6) 
By the cryptographic hash property 3 (mentioned in section 2.2), we know that it should 
be difficult to find two messages m1 and m2 such that their hash is same. Current hashing 
algorithms like SHA 256 and SHA 512 have a very negligible probability of finding two 
inputs which will lead to a collision. This implies that, 
Data of Bi = Data of Q (contradiction with (3)) 
This proves that our initial assumption was wrong. The algorithm always finds 
unauthorized modifications in our blockchain based ecosystem. 
After completing the above procedure, we are certain that all the unauthorized 
modifications are detected and recovered. 
 
6.4 An Illustrative Example 
 
Let us look at an example for unauthorized modifications and walk through our approach 
to fix it. Figure 5 shows a snapshot of the original unaltered blockchain and Figure 6 shows 
a snapshot of modified blockchain with modified critical data marked in red. Let us walk 
through the example and see how the approach recovers from unauthorized modifications. 
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Let us assume that there was a modification at a major node of the smart city. The data D1 
of block n was modified to D11 on this major node (Figure 6). 
 
 
 
Figure 5 Unaltered Blockchain 
 
Figure 6 Blockchain after Modifications 
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Input: All the major nodes of the smart city along with their blockchain. 
 
Step 1: Detection of unauthorized modification in the ecosystem 
The goal of this step is to detect if there were any unauthorized modifications in the 
blockchain of the major nodes. We take all the major nodes as the input to this step. 
 
1.1.We run an automated script before addition of every new block in the ecosystem. This 
script will be executed on all the major nodes of the smart city. 
 
1.2. At all the major nodes, the script will check for the condition: 
Hash(Bi) ≠ Prev_Hash of Bi+1 
As explained earlier in this chapter, this condition will be check the blockchain header 
for the above condition. From figure 6, we can see that due to the change in D1 to D11 
(marked in red), there was a subsequent change in the parent hash node of the merkle 
tree. This change in leaf nodes led to new intermediate hash value ‚‘Hash11‘ (marked 
in red). This change is further propagated up the merkle tree and the parent node of 
Hash11 is modified from Hash01 to Hash011 (marked in red). Ultimately, due to this 
change, the root node of the merkle tree ,i.e. root hash, is changed from Root_Hash(n) 
to Root_Hash‘(n) (marked in red). Changing of this field in the header of the blockchain 
will lead to change in the hash of the entire block. We will be using this property to 
identify any unauthorized modifications. Since the hash of the entire block n is now 
changed (due to change in Root_Hash value), the hash which was stored in the next 
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block, i.e. block n+1, will no longer match with this modified value. This is check by 
the condition mentioned above. 
Any change in data in block body leads to change in the root_hash field of its block 
header as shown in figure 7. We can see that now the hash of block n will not be equal 
to the hash(n) of block n+1 due to the cryptographic hash property 2 (section 2.2). Due 
to this change, step 1.2 will mark this node as suspicious and raise an alert. 
If this condition is true, i.e. the value of Hash(Bi-1) is not equal to the Prev_Hash field 
of Bi , then we know that there was some modification in the ecosystem. We raise an 
alert, which will be alarm all the other major nodes in the ecosystem (including the 
smart city government), and we add this major node to the list of suspicious node (SN). 
This script will run on all the major nodes and the output of this step is a list of 
suspicious nodes where the unauthorized modification took place. 
 
Output: The list of suspicious nodes SN. 
 
Step 2: Identification of the node and its block where the unauthorized modification took 
place. 
The goal of this step is to pinpoint the block where the unauthorized modification occurred. 
The input of this step is the SN, list of suspicious nodes. 
 
Input: List of suspicious nodes SN ={SNj | j=[0,m]} from Step 1. This will have the node 
where the unauthorized modification occurred in our example. 
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2.1. Let us assume that there is only one node in SN, which is the node where the 
unauthorized modification occurred in our example. So in this step we will 
generate the hash tree (merkle tree) from scratch for each of the blocks on this 
major node. So we generate the hash tree and calculate the Root_Hash value for 
all the blocks Bi on this major node. 
 
2.1.1. We take an arbitrary node t in the ecosystem which is not present in SN. For 
each of the newly generated Root_Hash values on the suspicious node SN, we 
compare the value of Root_Hash of the block Bi of SN with the value of 
Root_Hash of the block Bi of t. The aim of doing this comparison is to locate 
the block where the unauthorized modification took place.  
 
Figure 7 Checking Root_Hash on SN Node 
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According to the second pre-image resistance property of cryptographic hash 
function, the probability of finding a different message which lead to a specific 
hash value should be negligible. Since the hash functions which are used in 
this method follow the properties of the cryptographic hash functions, we can 
say that we will locate the unauthorized modification. 
 
2.1.2. In our example, the Root_Hash value of block Bi of SN and block Bi of t 
won‘t match (figure 7). This means that the unauthorized modification 
occurred at this block Bi. We flag this block number i of SN and pass it to the 
next step, step 3.  
 
Output: Block number ‘i’ of suspicious node SN where the unauthorized modification 
occurred. 
 
Step 3: Recovery from unauthorized modification 
The goal of this step is the recovery of the critical data at the node where unauthorized 
modification occurred. The input of this step is the block number ‘i’ of SN where the 
unauthorized modification occurred. 
 
Input: Block number I of SN from Step 2.1.2. 
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3.1.We take the block Bi of t (all the content stored in blockchain based database of 
block number ‘i’ of t) and overwrite it bit by bit to the blockchain based 
database of block number ‘I’ of SN. Due to the distributed nature of blockchain, 
we know that the critical data will be highly available so we use the data of an 
untampered node and overwrite it to data present on SN. 
 
3.2.We generate the hash tree again on the block Bi of SN after we complete the 
overwrite process. After we generate the hash tree, we compare the Root_Hash 
value of the newly generated hash tree and the Root_Hash value present in the 
block header of block Bi of t. 
 
3.3.We compare these two values mentioned in step 3.2. If the values are equal, 
then we know that all data was replaced successfully and accurately at SN. This 
means that the critical data was recovered from unauthorized modification at 
the major node SN. If the hash values are equal then the recover was 
successfully completed and we remove that major node from thelist of 
suspiciois node SN. If the hash values are not equal then we go back to step 3.1 
and follow the flow again till we get the recovered block on that major node. In 
our example, the recover is complete after we overwrite the data correctly from 
t to SN as shown in figure 8. 
 
Output: The recovered major node. 
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So we completed the recovery of the critical data D1 after there was an unauthorized 
modification on a major node. 
 
 
Figure 8 Recovered Block at SN 
  39 
CHAPTER 7 
EVALUATION 
 
This chapter shows the details of the simulation along with the results obtained. We used 
the metrics, communication cost and coordination cost, described in [25] for evaluation 
and analysis. Before each run, we set up the different parameters and defined the rules of 
the environment (data sharing and contractual agreements) and subjected the environment 
to randomized scripts for several runs. A script is an action/event that occurs in the smart 
city environment 
7.1 Overview of Scripts 
 
 
Using the definitions and concepts in [25], we simulated the smart city environment in the 
context of contractual agreements, data sharing and execution of predictive models. We 
used the parameters like topology (total number of SOHs, Hs and SOs), maximum number 
of allowed PMs to be added or deleted (to control the volatility of the environment), 
maximum number of allowed nodes (SOHs, Hs and SOs) to be added or removed (to 
control the volatility of the environment), number of scripts executed in one simulation 
run, etc, mentioned in [25] for our simulation of the smart city. We considered the 
following scripts in our simulation: 
• Deploying a predictive model 
This script emulated the activity of pushing a PM from a host to the SOs. 
• Deleting a PM 
This script emulated the activity of deleting a PM from the ecosystem. 
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• Updating a PM 
This script emulated the activity of updating a PM from a host to the SOs. 
• SO goes down 
This script emulated the incident when an SO is down/not working. 
• SOH goes down 
This script emulated the incident when an SOH is down/not working. 
• H goes down 
This script emulated the incident when an H is down/not working. 
• Adding a contract 
This script emulated the activity when a new contract is made between two or more 
entities in the ecosystem under the specified contract provisions. 
• Deleting a contract 
This script emulated the incident when a contract is cancelled or made void by the 
entities involved 
• Adding a new H 
This script emulated the incident when a new H is added to the ecosystem. 
• Adding a new SOH 
This script emulated the incident when a new SOH is added to the ecosystem. 
• Adding a new SO 
This script emulated the incident when a new SO is added to the ecosystem. 
We ran the simulation under different script runs of 20,50 and 100 we simulated the smart 
city environment. 
  41 
7.2 Simulation for Blockchain Approach vs the Centralized Approach 
 
Along the lines of complex adaptive system theory and simulations used in [25], we 
simulated a smart city environment again which simulates the behavior of the smart city 
and various organization which participate in its ecosystem. We ran the simulation for two 
cases: Case 1 depicts a conventional centralized approach to smart city and Case 2 depicts 
our approach. The aim of the simulation was to observe the communication and 
coordination costs of these two cases for a very dynamic and volatile ecosystem where 
participants are constantly entering and exiting the system. The simulation experiment was 
done just to observe the communication and network overhead in the two approaches for a 
volatile environment. The simulation doesn’t consider factors like startup investment cost, 
power consumption, specific operations needed to run the infrastructure (like mining and 
replication), etc. The underlying assumption for Case 1 is that the SOH interacts with the 
cloud for updates and changes in the smart contracts. Whereas for Case 2 the SOH will 
interact with the blockchain infrastructure present at the edge computing layer (closer to 
SOH in comparison to the cloud) for updates and changes in contracts. In case 1, the SOH 
contacted the central server after frequent periodic intervals to check for any updates. In 
Case 2, SOH contacted the blockchain just before addition of a block as well as an 
infrequent periodic interval (due to the nature of blockchains). After several hundred of 
simulation runs, we plotted the graph of communication cost vs coordination cost for 3 sets 
of scripts each for the two cases. Figure 9 shows the graph for Case 1 with script=20, figure 
10 shows the graph for case 1 with script=50 and figure 11 shows the graph for Case 1 with 
script=100. 
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Figure 9 Case 1 Script = 20 
 
 
Figure 10 Case 1 Script = 50 
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Figure 11 Case 1 Script = 100 
figure 12 shows the graph for case 2 with script=20, figure 13 shows the graph for case 2 
with script=20 and figure 14 shows the graph for case 2 with script=20. 
By comparing case 1 and 2 for script=20 (figure 9 and figure 12), we observed that the 
communication and coordination cost was much lower for case 2 as compared to case 1. A 
similar result was observed for script=50 (figure 10 and figure 13) and script=100 (figure 
11 and figure 14). We checked for arbitrary points in the graphs to compare the costs. The 
average communication cost in case 1 for script 20, 50 and 100 were in the order of 10 
million, 21 million and 23 million respectively when the coordination cost was set to 
60,000. The average communication cost in case 2 for script 20, 50 and 100 were in the 
order of 748k (748,000), 1 million and 700k respectively when the coordination cost was 
set to 60,000. This shows that the communication and network overhead is significantly 
less in our approach as compared to the centralized approach. 
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Figure 12 Case 2 Script = 20 
 
Figure 13 Case 2 Script = 50 
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Figure 14 Case 2 Script = 100 
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CHAPTER 8 
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
 
In this thesis, our approach for detecting, locating and recovering from an unauthorized 
modification in a large environment like a smart city was presented. The usage of 
blockchain in our approach greatly helped in making the entire system more democratized. 
Our approach generated better results in the simulation as compared to the traditional 
centralized approaches. We used proof by contradiction to prove mathematically that any 
unauthorized modifications in the environment was always detected. This approach brings 
a distributed view of managing a volatile system like a smart city environment.  
This approach has several sets of advantage and disadvantage in comparison to the 
conventional centralized solutions. 
The advantages of this approach are as follows: 
1. Any unauthorized modification of stored critical data can be detected and located 
very quickly. 
2. The system can recover very quickly from an unauthorized modification. 
3. All actions in the ecosystem have authenticity and non-repudiation. 
4. Provides an open and trusted platform for corporations to invest in smart city 
environment as any unauthorized modifications by a malicious actor can be 
detected. 
5. Cost per operation is significantly less as compared to centralized approach. 
6. This approach integrates the use of smart contracts which offers a unique way of 
enforcing smart city regulations and rules. 
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The limitations of this approach are as follows: 
1. This approach is not suitable for non-critical data due to the resource requirement 
of blockchain. 
2. If over 51% of the major nodes in the ecosystem is compromised then the approach 
fails [12][13][14]. 
3. Each major node in the ecosystem must have sophisticated hardware for performing 
computationally expensive operations. This also leads to high consumption of 
power on these nodes. 
 
Based on the points mentioned above, we can use this approach for practical purposes in a 
smart city for critical data only. Extending the scope to non-critical data will lead to a huge 
computational overhead as well as network overhead. 
The key points of this approach include better detection of unauthorized modifications 
from malicious insiders, distributed peer to peer network with no single point of failure, 
open and trusted environment for organizations and businesses to invest in, lower 
communication and network overhead, etc. As mentioned earlier, our approach does not 
fare well if we extend the scope to include non-critical data into the blockchain ecosystem. 
Also, there is need for large initial capital investment to operate and maintain the 
blockchain environment. The nodes participating in the process should perform 
computationally expensive operations in order to maintain the blockchain. Our approach 
fails when 51% or more of the total nodes are compromised. 
Blockchain technology can be employed in different ways to tackle some of the important 
issues of the smart cities. Future work includes implementing a prototype for this 
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ecosystem to get a better idea about some of the non-tangible aspects of the environment 
like the energy consumption of blockchain under different difficulty levels of mining, 
incorporating blockchain to enhance the access control mechanisms of the smart city 
entities and devices, and addressing privacy issues. Introduction of a cryptocurrency to a 
smart city will bring about a fresh way of managing daily lives in a smart city. Another 
future work would be to see how this blockchain approach can synergize with the 
cryptocurrency infrastructure for a smart city. 
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APPENDIX A  
SOURCE CODE FOR SIMULATIONS  
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The simulation code and its related files is made open source to help the research 
community. The entire source code can be accessed through the following link: 
 
https://github.com/ddnyanmothe/research_iot 
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